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EU Law on Nuclear Safety
By Ana Stanič*
The European Union (EU) is the first major regional nuclear actor to provide 
a binding legal framework on nuclear safety. The EU Council unanimously 
adopted Directive 2009/71 establishing a Community framework for the 
safety of nuclear installations in June 2009. The Directive builds primarily on 
the safety standards developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and the provisions of the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety. Nuclear safety 
standards are now part of EU law and are enforceable before the European 
Court of Justice and national courts of EU Member States. Importantly, the 
Directive represents the first step towards the harmonisation of safety standards 
across the EU and should contribute to improving public confidence in the 
nuclear sector across the EU.
Recent years have seen a renewed interest in nuclear energy among European 
Union (EU) Member States. With 1441 nuclear power reactors operating 
in 15 Member States, the EU has the largest number of nuclear power 
plants (NPPs) in the world.2 At present, nuclear energy provides one-third 
of the EU’s electricity supply and represents 15 per cent of the total energy 
consumed in the EU.3
* Ana Stanič is an English Solicitor Advocate specialising in energy law and international 
commercial arbitration. She can be contacted by e-mail at anastanic@ealaw.eu. A ver-
sion of this article was presented at the International Conference on Nuclear Energy 
for New Europe 2009 held in Slovenia from 14 to 17 September 2009.
1 For details regarding the number, location and size of the nuclear power reactors 
located in the EU see http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/decommisioning/decom-
missioning_en.htm and http://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/n/nuclear-
power-plant-europe.htm.
2 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament – Nuclear Illustrative Programme Presented under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty 
for the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, COM(2006) 844, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= CELEX:52006DC0844:EN:NO. 
3 European Commission, Nuclear Energy, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/index_en.htm.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698215
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The nuclear energy renaissance is being spurred by growing electricity 
demand, concerns about security supply of energy and climate change. 
First, with electricity demand continuing to grow, new NPPs will need to 
be constructed and/or the operating lifetime of existing plants extended 
simply to maintain the existing share of nuclear energy of total electricity 
production. The fact that many NPPs are expected to be decommissioned 
in the next 20 years given their relatively old age (average 25 years old) is 
increasing pressure to build new NPPs.4
Secondly, the EU Commission (the ‘Commission’) identified nuclear 
energy as a potentially important element of ensuring the EU’s security of 
supply in its Second Strategic Review.5 With the EU’s energy production 
satisfying less than half of its needs, there are concerns about growing import 
dependency.6 The gas war between the Ukraine and Russia in January 2009, 
which left a number of countries in south-east Europe without electricity for 
nearly two weeks, further exposed the EU’s energy vulnerability and led to 
calls to increase the share of nuclear energy in the EU’s energy mix. Although 
most of the uranium needed for the operation of NPPs in the EU is imported, 
nuclear energy is seen as a domestic energy source. Moreover, with over 40 
per cent of all uranium produced in Canada and Australia,7 there is little 
concern in the EU about import dependency in respect of nuclear energy.
Thirdly, being essentially carbon emissions free, nuclear energy is seen as 
one of the options for meeting the EU’s target for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions by 20 per cent by 2020 and, thus, tackling climate change.
Although the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) 
has been in existence since 1957,8 nuclear safety had not been regulated at 
the EU level. The above-mentioned increase in interest in nuclear energy, 
however, led to calls for the adoption of an EU framework for nuclear safety 
4 ENSREG, Discussion document on Consequences of EU instruments in the field of Nuclear 
Safety, Final Report, http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/tren/nuclear_safety_and_waste/
library?l=/general_archive/public/p2009-08_instrumentspdf_2/_EN_1.0_&a=d, at 19. 
5 European Commission, Second Strategic Review, November 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/
energy/ strategies/2008/2008_11_ser2_en.htm.
6 European Commission, An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan, Europe’s Cur-
rent and Future Energy Position, Demand – Resources – Investments, COM(2008) 781 final, 
November 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2008/doc/2008_11_ser2/
strategic_energy_review_wd_future_position2.pdf, at 8.
7 According to the World Nuclear Association, Canada was the world’s largest producer of 
uranium, producing 20.5 per cent of the world’s uranium from mines, and Australia the third 
largest producer in 2008. For further details see www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf23.html.
8 Euratom was created pursuant to the Euratom Treaty in 1957. Together with the 
European Coal and Steel Community and European Economic Community it formed 
part of the European Communities. Euratom has continued to exist as a separate legal 
organisation after the other two communities were absorbed by the European Union. 
For details of the Euratom Treaty, see note 21 below. 
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to ensure greater harmonisation of national safety standards concerning the 
installation, operation and decommissioning of NPPs. Concerns over the 
safety of NPPs in ‘new’9 Member States, a key issue during the EU accession 
negotiations, lent further support to such calls.10
The Commission considers nuclear safety crucial to Member States’ 
decisions on whether to continue to use nuclear energy, as well as for 
improving public confidence across the EU in the nuclear sector. To achieve 
these aims, Euratom Council Directive 2009/71 establishing a Community 
framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations (the ‘Directive’) was 
unanimously adopted by the EU Council on 25 June 2009.11
This article discusses the key provisions of the Directive highlighting any 
differences between its terms and those of the 1994 Convention on Nuclear 
Safety (the ‘Convention’). By way of background, the paper first examines 
the international and EU framework for nuclear safety.
International framework for nuclear safety
Until the adoption of the Directive, the regulation of nuclear safety was the 
responsibility of each Member State. All Member States that operate nuclear 
facilities for the generation of electricity are parties to the Convention, as well 
as other multilateral agreements that concern fuel and waste management.12 
In addition, as members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
they comply with the soft law safety standards adopted by the IAEA and, in 
particular, with the Fundamental Safety Principles, Safety Standards Series 
No SF-1 (the ‘Fundamental Safety Principles’).13
9 The ‘new’ Member States are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. They joined the EU in May 2004.
10 During the accession negotiations the EU requested that eight NPPs (Bohunice 1 and 
2, Kozloduy 1 to 4 and Ignalina 1 and 2) in Lithuania, Bulgaria and Slovakia be closed 
over the 2002 to 2009 period. Further details are available at http://ec.europa.eu/en-
largement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/negotiations/eu10_bul-
garia_romania/chapters/chap_14_en. 
11 OJ 2009 L 172/18. The text of the Directive is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009L0071:EN:HTML.
12 These being: the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and 
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (available at www.iaea.org/Publica-
tions/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc546.pdf), the 1986 Convention on Early No-
tification of a Nuclear Accident (available at www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Infcircs/Others/infcirc335.shtml) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a 
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (available at www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc336.shtml).
13 L Veuchelen, ‘The Legal Value of General Principles, Technical Norms and Standards 
in European Nuclear Safety Law: The Imbalance Between Soft and Hard Law and the 
Need for Global Regulatory Governance’ (2009) 18 E E Envir L R 215, 216 et seq. 
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Since the terms of the Directive are based on the terms of the Convention 
and certain principles set out IAEA Standards these documents will be 
discussed in turn.
Convention on Nuclear Safety
The Convention was adopted in Vienna in 1994 and entered into force in 
1996. It commits state parties operating land-based civil NPPs to maintaining 
a high level of safety by setting international benchmarks concerning 
nuclear safety. The obligations of the contracting parties cover the siting, 
design, construction and operation of NPPs, as well as the establishment 
of a legislative and regulatory framework for safety of nuclear installations, 
the effective separation between regulatory bodies and other bodies or 
organisations concerned with the promotion or utilisation of nuclear energy, 
the availability of adequate financial and human resources, the assessment 
and verification of safety, quality assurance and radiation protection and 
emergency preparedness.14
However, the Convention is only an ‘incentive’ instrument. It does 
not contain any mechanism for enforcement or sanction in case of non-
compliance. Instead, it depends for its effectiveness on a process of peer 
review and, by extension, peer pressure. Specifically, Articles 5, 20 and 21 of 
the Convention require each contracting party to report every three years at 
the meeting of the IAEA to other contracting parties on the measures taken 
to meet the nuclear safety obligations set out in the Convention. At these 
meetings, pursuant to Article 20, other contracting parties can comment 
on the measures adopted and seek clarifications. During the process of 
review contracting parties are encouraged to implement improvements 
recommended by other contracting parties and the IAEA.15 
IAEA standards
The IAEA seeks to build and strengthen the international safety and security 
regime through the development of advisory international standards, codes 
and guides. In the safety area, these cover nuclear installations, radioactive 
sources, radioactive materials in transport and radioactive waste.
In 2006, the Fundamental Safety Principles were adopted by the IAEA. The 
document sets out ten fundamental safety principles constituting ‘the basis 
14 For the terms of the Convention see www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/
Others/ inf449.shtml.
15 Veuchelen, note 13 above, loc cit.
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on which to establish safety requirements for protection against exposure to 
ionizing radiation under the IAEA’s safety standards programme and provide 
the rationale for its wider safety related programme medicine, industry, 
agriculture, research and education’.16 The ten principles are:
1. The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person or 
organisation responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to 
radiation risks.
2. An effective legal and governmental framework for safety, including an 
independent regulatory body, must be established and sustained.
3. Effective leadership and management for safety must be established and 
sustained in organisations concerned with, and facilities and activities 
that give rise to, radiation risks.
4. Facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks must yield an 
overall benefit.
5. Protection must be optimised to provide the highest level of safety that 
can reasonably be achieved.
6. Measures for controlling radiation risks must ensure that no individual 
bears an unacceptable risk of harm.
7. People and the environment, present and future, must be protected 
against radiation risks.
8. All practical efforts must be made to prevent and mitigate nuclear or 
radiation accidents.
9. Arrangements must be made for emergency preparation and response 
to nuclear or radiation incidents.
10. Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks must 
be justified and optimised.
The IAEA must apply these principles in its own operations. However, these 
principles are not binding on Member States as they are non-mandatory 
recommendations only.17
Other organisations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), assist member countries in maintaining 
and further developing, through international cooperation, the scientific, 
technological and legal bases required for the safe, environmentally friendly 
and economic use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. For example 
the Nuclear Energy Agency, a specialised agency within the OECD and the 
16 See Fundamental Safety Principles, Safety Standards Series No SF-1, www-pub.iaea.org/ 
MTCD/publications/PDF/ Pub1273_web.pdf, at viii.
17 See para 1.5 of the Fundamental Safety Principles, ibid 2. 
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only intergovernmental nuclear energy organisation bringing together 
the developed countries of North America, Europe and the Asia-Pacific, 
is a forum for exchange of experience concerning nuclear energy. It has, 
inter alia, adopted consensus positions on nuclear safety, radioactive waste 
management and radiological protection and enables member countries to 
join forces to carry out research or scientific inter-comparison exercises on 
a cost-sharing basis.18
Over the years, this framework of organisations and conventions has 
resulted in the significant harmonisation of national nuclear safety rules. 
However, significant differences remain between the national regulatory and 
organisational frameworks and, more importantly, there is no mechanism 
of enforcement or sanction in case of lack of compliance with the terms of 
the Convention or the IAEA standards.
EU framework for nuclear safety
For historical and other reasons, nuclear energy and nuclear safety are 
regulated somewhat differently from other sectors under EU law.19 The 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (the ‘Euratom 
Treaty’) was adopted in 1957.20 The purpose of the Treaty was to create 
among the Member States conditions for the establishment and growth of 
the nuclear industry.21 The specific tasks accorded to Euratom under the 
Euratom Treaty include to:
• promote research and ensure the dissemination of technical information;
• establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of 
the general public and ensure that they are applied;
18 Further details regarding the work of the Nuclear Energy Agency are available at 
www.nea.fr/html/nea/flyeren.html.
19 Moreover, it should be noted that the European Community institutions do not have 
explicit competence in the energy area, although energy-related Community legisla-
tion has been adopted since the late 1960s based on general non-energy provisions and 
principles of the EC Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty, which at the time of writing is expected 
to enter into force in December 2009, contains a new energy title which provides 
express competence to Community institutions in the sphere of energy including to 
ensure the functioning of the internal market security of energy supply and energy 
efficiency. For further details see Art 194 of the Lisbon Treaty, available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:SOM:EN:HTML. For further details 
concerning the history of EU acquis in energy law and policy see B Delvaux, M Hunt 
and K Talus, EU Energy Law and Policy Issues (Euroconfidential, 2007) 17–29.
20 Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/en/treaties/dat/12006A/12006A.html.
21 As such, there is no provision under EU law creating an internal market for nuclear 
energy as is the case in respect of electricity and gas. 
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• facilitate investment and ensure the establishment of the basic installations 
necessary for the development of nuclear energy in the EU;
• ensure that all users in the EU receive a regular and equitable supply of 
ores and nuclear fuels; and
• make certain that civil nuclear materials are not diverted to other 
(particularly military) purposes.22
Ensuring the safety of nuclear installations is not a responsibility explicitly 
granted to the Community by the Euratom Treaty. Article 2(b) of the 
Euratom Treaty provides for the establishment of uniform safety standards 
to protect the health of workers and of the general public. Article 30 further 
provides that basic standards shall be laid down ‘within the Community for 
the protection of health of workers and the general public against the dangers 
arising from ionising radiations’. The term ‘basic standards’ is defined in 
the same article as maximum permissible doses compatible with adequate 
safety, maximum permissible levels of exposure and contamination and 
the fundamental principles governing the health surveillance of workers. 
Until 2002, Article 30 was considered as giving Community institutions 
competence to adopt directives and recommendations in the field of 
radiation protection and waste management only.23 In 2002, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) clarified in Case 29/9924 that the Community shares 
competences with Member States in respect of nuclear safety as well as 
radiation protection.
The adoption of common EU nuclear safety standards has been under 
discussion for a number of years. The Commission argued that national 
legislation in the nuclear field and measures taken by the national regulators 
are not sufficient from the Community perspective since, despite a degree of 
harmonisation discussed above, nuclear safety measures still vary from one 
Member State to another. This, it argued, did not allow the Community to 
satisfy itself that the health protection requirements of Article 2(b) of the 
Euratom Treaty were complied with.
22 See Art 2 of the Euratom Treaty.
23 Radiation protection refers to measures aimed at protecting human beings and the 
environment against ionising radiation. On the other hand, nuclear safety deals with 
measures aimed at establishing and maintaining effective defences in nuclear instal-
lations against potential radiological risks in order to protect individuals, society and 
the environment against the damaging effects of ionising radiation emitted by such 
installations. Traditionally, radiation protection and nuclear safety were considered as 
separate disciplines. For further details see Communication from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament – Nuclear safety in the European Union, 
COM/2002/0605 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CEL
EX:52002DC0605:EN:HTML.
24 OJ 2009 L 172/18, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:200
9:172:0018:01:EN:HTML.
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However, previous Commission proposals seeking to harmonise nuclear 
safety standards met with resistance from certain Member States (including 
the UK and Germany), which were concerned that such proposals reduced 
the powers of national regulators in this strategically important industry.25 
In 2004, the EU Council started a wide-ranging consultation process on 
the use by Member States of existing international instruments on nuclear 
safety and management of radioactive waste and spent fuel. This eventually 
led to the establishment of the High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and 
Waste Management – the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group 
(ENSREG).26 The ENSREG is an independent expert body composed of 
heads and senior staff members of national nuclear safety or regulatory 
authorities from all Member States as well as a senior representative from 
the Commission.
In 2007, ENSREG considered whether there was a need for a legally 
binding instrument on nuclear safety at the EU level. As its members were 
highly divided, an agreement was reached to set up a group to analyse 
the pros and cons of such EU legislation (on the basis of a set of agreed 
principles) before any legislation was proposed. It was agreed that the 
following principles would be used to prepare the analysis:
1. Maintain and seek to continuously improve nuclear safety and its 
regulation, and add value.
2. Just as every Member State has the right to decide to use nuclear power 
or not, so every Member State has the right to impose more stringent 
nuclear safety requirements than those commonly applied.
3. Allow flexibility and not fundamentally change a Member State’s 
national nuclear regulatory approach.
4. Seek to enhance, not reduce, the power, roles, responsibilities or 
capability of the national nuclear regulatory body.
5. Do not expand the role of the Commission in regulatory decision-
making or activities or introduce other bodies.
6. Do not divert resources away from national nuclear regulatory 
responsibilities or international nuclear safety cooperation.
7. Be compliant with the principles/obligations of the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety.
25 R Axelrod, ‘The European Commission and Member States: Conflict Over Nuclear 
Safety’ (2006) 26 Perspectives. Review of International Affairs 5, 5.
26 Commission Decision 2007/530 Euratom of 17 July 2007 on establishing the European 
High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management, OJ 2007 L 195/44, avail-
able at http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/tren/nuclear_safety_and_waste/library?l=/
general_archive/public/hlg200711ppdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d. 
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8. Any proposals should be non-discriminatory towards those who use or 
do not use nuclear power.
9. Seek to improve the transparency of nuclear safety and its regulation.
10. Be clear on the roles and responsibilities of any organisations involved.27
Based on the analysis, in November 2008, the Commission tabled a revised 
directive on nuclear safety.28 Subsequent revision of the proposal paved the 
way for the adoption of the Directive on 25 June 2009.
Key provisions of the Directive
The Directive incorporates the provisions of the Convention as well as some 
of the IAEA’s safety standards and principles set out in the Fundamental 
Safety Principles. Since Member States, as well as Euratom,29 are parties to 
the Convention, most of the provisions of the Directive will not be new to 
them. The innovation of the Directive is that it imposes legally enforceable 
obligations on Member States concerning nuclear safety, a failure to comply 
with which can result in sanctions being imposed against them under EU 
law. Member States have until July 2011 to transpose the Directive into 
national law.30
In this section, the key provisions of the Directive are set out and any 
differences between them and those of the Convention highlighted.
Scope of the Directive
The Directive concerns the nuclear safety of civilian nuclear installations. The 
term ‘nuclear installations’ is defined in Article 3(1) as ‘(a) an enrichment 
plant, nuclear fuel fabrication plant, nuclear power plant, reprocessing plant, 
research reactor facility, spent fuel storage facility and (b) storage facilities 
for radioactive waste that are on the same site as and are directly related to 
27 ENSREG, Report of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group, July 2009, at 13, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/ensreg/doc/2009_ensreg_report.pdf.
28 European Commission, Nuclear Safety: Commission moves ahead, Press Release, 26 
November 2008, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/17
76&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en.
29 Euratom became a party to the Convention in January 2000.
30 Under EU law a regulation is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Mem-
ber States, while a directive is binding on Member States as to the result to be achieved, 
but leaves the choice of form and methods of implementation to them. Since directives 
are not directly applicable they have to be transposed by Member States into national 
law before their provisions have legal effect. For further details regarding the differ-
ence between directives and regulations see P Craig and G Burca, EU Law, Text, Cases 
and Materials (4th edn, Oxford University Press, 2007) 20 et seq. 
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the nuclear installations listed under point (a)’. As such, the scope of the 
Directive is broader than that of the Convention, which applies only to any 
land-based civilian NPPs and any ‘storage, handling and treatment facilities 
for radioactive materials as are on the same site’ as the NPP and ‘are directly 
related to the operation of such NPP’.31 Member States that have adopted 
the Convention’s narrower definition of the term will need to amend their 
law to ensure proper implementation of the Directive.
Competence sharing concerning nuclear energy
Recitals 8 and 9 of the Directive emphasise that each Member State is free to 
decide on its energy mix and that nuclear safety remains the responsibility 
of each Member State. As such, pursuant to the Directive, the competence 
of the EU Community institutions is to ensure:
• the adoption of uniform Community-wide safety standards; and
• the compliance of Member States with the terms of the Directive.32
Going forward, nuclear safety standards will be proposed by the Commission 
and adopted by the EU Council in accordance with the procedure set out in 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Euratom Treaty. The ENSREG will take a leading 
role in drafting Community-wide safety standards.33 
A Member State’s implementation of the Directive is ensured by the 
enforcement mechanism set out in the Euratom Treaty. Pursuant to Articles 
141 to 143 of the Euratom Treaty the Commission and Member States have 
the right to commence proceedings against a Member State before the ECJ 
should it fail to implement the Directive and comply with safety standards.
It is important to note that the Directive does not prevent Member States 
from adopting safety measures that are more stringent than those covered 
by the Directive, provided this is done in compliance with Community law 
(see Article 2(2)). Moreover, the Directive makes clear that in developing 
a national framework for nuclear safety the specific circumstances of the 
Member State in question may be taken into account.34 As such, rather than 
prescribing a legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear safety, the 
Directive provides a safety net, ensuring a minimum level of nuclear safety 
within the EU. In this respect its aim is similar to that of the Convention.
31 See Art 2(i) of the Convention. 
32 It will be interesting to see how the competences granted to Community institutions 
under Art 194 of the Lisbon Treaty will be interpreted with respect to nuclear energy. 
For further details, see note 19 above. 
33  See Art 2 of the Commission Decision of 17 July 2007 on establishing the European 
High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management, note 26 above.
34  See para 10 in the Preamble to the Directive. 
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Obligation to establish a framework
Pursuant to Article 4 of the Directive, a Member State is required, as a matter 
of EU law, to establish a national legislative, regulatory and organisational 
framework for the safety of nuclear installations. The framework must allocate 
responsibilities and provide for coordination between the various state bodies 
involved in nuclear safety.
Incorporating the provisions of Article 7 of the Convention and reflecting 
the second of the Fundamental Safety Principles, the Directive provides in 
Article 4(1) that the responsibilities for the following areas must be provided 
under the framework:
• the adoption of national nuclear safety requirements;
• the provision of a system of licensing and prohibition of operation of 
nuclear installations without a licence;
• the supervision of nuclear safety; and
• enforcement actions, including suspension of operation and modification 
or revocation of a licence.
Member states retain the discretion to choose how to meet nuclear safety 
requirements.35
Recognising that a national framework is a living document, Article 
4(2) requires a Member State to ensure that it is maintained and improved 
in the light of operational experience, technological developments, 
the outcomes of safety analyses and the results of safety research. Since 
the Directive’s requirements regarding the framework are substantially 
the same as those under the Convention, Member States with nuclear 
installations will already have frameworks in place, which comply with 
most of the requirements of the Directive. As such, the Directive will not 
require significant changes in national law. For non-nuclear Member 
States, the Directive provides a legal basis should the state choose to build 
nuclear installations in the future.
Effective independence and powers of regulatory bodies
Article 5(2) of the Directive obliges Member States to ensure the ‘effective 
independence’ of the national regulatory body for nuclear safety from 
other bodies and organisations concerned with the promotion or 
utilisation of nuclear energy. In other words, it requires not only de jure 
but also de facto independence. Although Article 8(2) of the Convention 
requires ‘effective separation’ rather than ‘effective independence’ of 
35 See Art 4(1)(a) of the Directive.
Journal of EnErgy & natural rEsourcEs law Vol 28 No 1 2010156
regulatory bodies, it is unlikely that the two tests will be construed as 
imposing different requirements.
The Directive spells out the powers that should be accorded to the 
regulatory authority by Member States to ensure they comply with their 
obligations regarding the Framework as set out in Article 4(1) (see discussion 
on the legal framework above).
Licence-holders’ primary obligation for nuclear safety
As under the Convention and the third principle of the Fundamental Safety 
Principles, Article 6 of the Directive emphasises that the licence-holder has 
primary responsibility for the nuclear safety of a nuclear installation. Article 
6 also provides that such responsibility cannot be delegated.
Member States are required to ensure licence-holders regularly assess, 
verify and continuously improve (as far as is reasonably achievable) 
the nuclear safety of their nuclear installation(s). This has to be done 
in a systemic and verifiable manner and under the supervision of the 
competent national regulatory authority. In addition, as discussed above, 
Member States must ensure that actions are taken, including revocation 
of licence, in case a licence-holder fails to comply with its obligations 
regarding safety standards.
In addition, and as under the Convention, the Directive requires the 
licence-holders to provide and maintain adequate financial and human 
resources to fulfil their obligations with respect to nuclear safety.36 Member 
States are also required to ensure that arrangements are made by regulatory 
authorities and licence-holders for the education and training of staff with 
responsibility for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations.37
Reporting obligations
The Directive establishes a uniform reporting structure at the Community 
level. Under Article 9, Member States must submit a report to the Commission 
on the implementation of the Directive for the first time in 2014 and 
thereafter every three years. Pursuant to Article 9(2) of the Directive, the 
Commission is required to submit a report to the EU Council and Parliament 
on the progress made to implement the Directive on receipt of reports from 
Member States.
The reporting requirements differ from those under the Convention. 
36 See Art 6(5) of the Directive. 
37 See Art 7 of the Directive. 
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Under the Convention, a contracting party is required to submit a report 
every three years at the meeting of the IAEA to other contracting parties 
for their review and comment. As discussed above, there is no mechanism 
of enforcement or sanction in the case of non-compliance with the 
reporting requirements or recommendations made by other state parties. 
Instead, the Convention depends for its effectiveness on a process of 
peer review and, by extension, peer pressure. Under the Directive, the 
reporting requirements are enforceable under Community law both by 
the Commission and Member States pursuant to Articles 141 and 142 of 
the Euratom Treaty respectively.
In addition, under the Directive, Member States are required to conduct 
self-assessments of segments of their framework (as chosen by that Member 
State) every ten years and subject it to international peer review. This mirrors 
the process of the peer review mechanism in place under the Convention. 
However, this process is compulsory rather than voluntary in nature.
The Directive seeks to synchronise the timing of the preparation of the 
reports under the Convention and the Directive so as to reduce the reporting 
burden on Member States.38 However, although initially the reports under 
the Directive and Convention will be substantially similar, it is likely that as 
new standards are adopted at the Community level the nature and the scope 
of the two sets of reports will start to diverge.
Conclusion
The Directive sets out the first legally binding Community-wide rules 
concerning nuclear safety. It incorporates the provisions of the Convention 
into Community law as well as certain of the IAEA’s soft law fundamental 
principles. In particular, it requires Member States to establish a national 
regulatory, legislative and organisational framework concerning nuclear 
safety and ensure effective independence of the national regulatory 
authorities concerned with nuclear safety. Member States have until July 
2011 to transpose the Directive into national law.
While all Member States are parties to the Convention, the latter is 
only an incentive instrument, which depends for its effectiveness on a 
process of peer review and, by extension, peer pressure. The Directive, on 
the other hand, imposes on Member States legally binding obligations, 
which can now be enforced through the enforcement mechanism of 
the Euratom Treaty. Accordingly, going forward, disputes such as the 
one that arose between the Czech Republic and Austria concerning the 
38 See Art 9 of the Directive.
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starting-up of the Temelin NPP in the Czech Republic could be resolved 
before the ECJ.39
The main shortcomings of the Directive are that it does not provide for 
surprise inspections of NPPs and independent verifications will continue to 
be undertaken by national regulators rather than by Community institutions. 
This, plus the fact that the reports are unlikely to be made public (see 
‘Reporting obligations’ above), means that the Directive may in practice 
contribute little to enhancing nuclear safety in the EU and increasing public 
confidence in nuclear energy.
Despite these shortcomings, the Directive represents a first step towards 
the adoption of uniform and more detailed Community-wide standards 
concerning nuclear safety including in respect of the design, operational 
and decommissioning requirements. Unlike the IAEA safety standards, which 
are non-mandatory recommendations, these Community safety standards 
will be legally binding since they will be adopted pursuant to Articles 30 to 
32 of the Euratom Treaty. Accordingly, the process for their adoption and 
adaptation at the Community level is likely to be much quicker compared to 
the IAEA’s intergovernmental decision-making process. ENSREG is expected 
to issue a good practice guidance to Member States concerning transparency 
at the end of November 2009.40 A dedicated EU website providing the public 
and other stakeholders with coordinated and easily accessible information 
on nuclear safety across the EU is expected to go live at the end of 2009.41
39 The dispute between the two countries arose in 1998. In 2000, the Commission acted 
as conciliator between the two countries and a protocol was signed between them to 
embark on a ‘trialogue’ between Austria, the Czech Republic and the Commission 
on the 29 issues that were of concern to the Austrian authorities. On 29 November 
2001, the two countries agreed, under the mediation of the Commission, to enter into 
a bilateral agreement for the monitoring of the protocol whereby Austria was given a 
‘watching brief over the safety of [Temelin]. This watching brief of one State over the 
nuclear safety of an installation in another State is an atypical mechanism. Clearly, if 
there had been common safety standards, the solution would have been much simpler. 
These standards would have served as a reference for Austria and taken over by the 
Czech Republic as part of the Community acquis. The Commission would then have 
intervened as a matter of course to verify that the acquis had been suitably taken over’. 
European Commission, note 24 above, Section 1.1. For further details regarding this 
dispute see R Axelrod, ‘Nuclear Power and EU Enlargement: The Case of Temelin’ 
(2004) 13 Environmental Politics 153.
40 ENSREG, note 27 above, at 9.
41 Further information about ENSREG and its work is available at http://ec.europa.eu/
energy/nuclear/ensreg/ensreg_en.htm.
